In January 2008, four decades after the famous Tet Offensive, the secretive National Security Agency (NSA) declassified the 500-page report Spartans in Darkness [1], a most fascinating study on the U.S. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations in Indochina, from the Japanese surrender in 1945 until the fall of Saigon in 1975.
The most interesting part of the report is, in my opinion, chapter 5 [pdf], on the highly controversial Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The author of the report, Robert J. Hanyok, shows that, contrary to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara‘s assertions at the time, there was no attack on U.S. ships on August 4, 1964.
[ USS Maddox in 1964 - photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy ]
Note, however, that on August 2, 1964 the USS Maddox was engaged by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. In other words, the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident”, in fact, consisted of two separate incidents. An alternative version of chapter 5 is Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish [2], released by the NSA in 2005 under the FOIA.
Also quite interesting is the study of the enemy’s Communications Intelligence (COMINT) operations in chapter 8 [pdf]. Not surprisingly, the enemy monitored (and jammed) U.S. radio communications. However, the revelation that the enemy did manage to create blue-on-blue situations by penetrating the U.S. radio communications and calling U.S. artillery / air strikes on U.S. ground units is somewhat shocking.
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References:
[1] Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2002.
[2] Robert J. Hanyok, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: the Gulf of Tonkin mystery, 2–4 August 1964 [pdf], Cryptologic Quarterly, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2001.
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Related:
- The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 years later: flawed intelligence and the decision for war in Vietnam (2004)
Tags: COMINT, COMSEC, Gulf of Tonkin Incident, NSA, Robert Hanyok, SIGINT, Spartans in Darkness, Vietnam War
May 16, 2011 at 06:59 |
As an officer who was in USS Turner Joy’s Combat Information Center on 4 August 1964, I find the Hanyok commentary on that night’s incident in the Tonkin Gulf a compendium of flawed assumptions and conclusions.
In part, the problem with his analysis lies in his acceptance of the 3 September 1964 NSA characterization of North Vietnamese surveillance of destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy on 4 August as “the virtual absence of trackings.” That assessment is based on an apparent lack of signals intelligence intercepts of North Vietnamese radio transmissions of position reports on the two destroyers.
But NSA signals intelligence doesn’t tell the whole story. Far from it. Apart from the noted presence of at least one shadowing North Vietnamese Swatow-class gunboat, Turner Joy’s passive electronic countermeasures intercept equipment detected a number of North Vietnamese radar transmissions, including lockons, during the day indicating that the North Vietnamese knew full well where we were.
It’s also notable that in December 2005 following the declassification and publication of the Hanyok study, NSA’s Deputy Director of Policy and Records Louis Giles stated:
If you’re interested in a more detailed and critical analysis of Hanyok’s study and of the Edwin Moise book held up as the “definitive” analysis of the 4 August event, I’ve posted one at What’s wrong with Tonkin Gulf Incident History.